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Abstract: Based on a Kantian conception of aesthetic judgments, this paper explores the conflict between
ethics and aesthetics in valuations of art. In it, I argue for the insufficiency of the three existing camps in
the philosophical literature on the question of whether ethics do and/or should influence aesthetic
judgments of art. While Autonomism says never, Moralism always, and Moderate Moralism sometimes, I
aim to show that they are all deficient because they lack due consideration for subjective interest, a key
link between ethics and aesthetics. The argument proceeds with a critical look at two articles: Posner’s
Against Ethical Criticism and Carroll’s Moderate Moralism, which support Autonomism and Moderate
Moralism respectively. I conclude that, due to their being linked by subjective interest, both ethics and
aesthetics inform art valuations, and yet are opposites that exclude each other. The role of an ethical
and/or aesthetic judgment of art is wholly and solely dependent upon the level of subjective interest that
exists between an audience and a work of art.1
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During a promotional conference for his film Melancholia, critically acclaimed film director Lars Von
Trier found himself banned from the 2011 Cannes Festival and declared persona non grata for all future
events.2 The incident involved Von Trier’s expression of sympathy with Hitler and the Nazis. Although this
was the first official condemnation of the director, his work has oftentimes been accused of misogyny and
misanthropy.3 The veracity of such accusations may be questionable, but instances such as this are
practical examples of the much debated conflict between morality and aesthetics in valuations of art. On
the question of whether a work’s ethical content ought to influence our aesthetic valuation of it,
arguments vary among three main camps; Autonomism, which answers never, Moralism, which answers
always, and Moderate Moralism, which answers sometimes.
My goal for this paper is to show that all three camps are insufficient for they overlook an
important link between morality and aesthetics: subjective interest. A moral outlook in valuations of art is
certainly possible, but such valuations often fail aesthetically. Kant’s discussion of the criteria of judgments
of the beautiful/aesthetic will serve as the conceptual foundation of the present argument. 4 I will proceed,
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firstly, with an exposition of the relationship between ethics and aesthetics, which are both linked and
separated by subjective interest; and secondly, with an elaboration of the argument through a critical
analysis of two articles: Posner’s (1997) Against Ethical Criticism5 and Carroll’s (1996) Moderate Moralism.6
Against autonomist claims, I argue that ethics and aesthetics are related and, as such, can both be
considered in art valuation. The two domains are based on the same criterion that defines each, namely
subjective interest.7 Kant advances that aesthetic judgment requires detachment from the object of
judgment.8 The judge of beauty must not have the least interest in the object of judgment. Although
complete detachment is hardly attainable, a certain level of detachment is required. To rephrase Kant’s
words one may say that aesthetic judgment is one in which all subjective interest is suspended as best as
possible. An aesthetic appraisal acknowledges that subjective interest is prone to being present, and so it
aims for the suspension of such interest to move from subjectivity towards objectivity. What about ethics?
Ethical judgment is, likewise, based on the concept of subjective interest. When one ethically valuates a
work of art, one departs from an objective stance. One has in mind some moral tenets that act as criteria
for judgment. These tenets have to be as objective9 as possible, for otherwise there would not be a
justification to posit any work of art or anything at all against them. Even though they are essentially
objective, these moral tenets exist in the form of beliefs. Beliefs necessarily carry a subjective aspect
because the believer—and, here, the judge—recognizes them as true, making them her own. It is only
then that she can use them as criteria for judgment. We have, hereby, shown that ethics and aesthetics
are closely related by their being founded on subjective interest.
The previous discussion calls for a clarification on the difference between ethics and aesthetics; for
if they are closely related, it is not evident how they are mutually exclusive. It is important to note that the
two are somehow opposed to each other. Whereas Kantian aesthetics call for the suspension of all
interest, ethics require this interest for their very existence. Morality, though it may be objective, exists
concretely in relation to the beings with whom it is concerned. If morality is about right and wrong, and

5

Posner, Richard A. "Against Ethical Criticism." Philosophy and Literature 21.1 (1997): 1-27.
Carroll, N. "Moderate Moralism." The British Journal of Aesthetics 36.3 (1996): 223-38.
7
It should be clear that what arouses interest in each case is different: for aesthetics, the consideration of objects in themselves;
and for ethics, the concern with believing and/or doing that which is right
8
“Everyone must admit that a judgment about beauty in which there is mixed the least interest is very partial and not a pure
judgment of taste”, he says. (Kant, Immanuel, and Paul Guyer. “Critique of the Aesthetic Power of Judgment.” In Critique of the
Power of Judgment. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000.5:205)
9
I use the term “objective” in this work, not as the opposite of “subjective,” but as an expression of the Kantian concept of the
universality of laws or tenets postulated from an individual—subjective—stance with an assumption of general applicability.
6

10

what one ought or ought not to do, it has to be based on the behavior of the subjects.10 However universal
the behavioral consideration may be, it remains subjective at least in relation to a species if not to an
individual. This subjectivity is strengthened by the aforementioned belief component. We see, therefore,
how the two domains are mutually exclusive.
But if it is impossible to completely suspend subjective interest, as is required by aesthetic
appraisal, could ethics and aesthetics be as removed from each other as I seem to suggest? The claimed
impossibility to attain pure disinterestedness is an exaggerated statement. I was once standing by a river
and the misty morning view was one the most beautiful sights I have ever experienced. Deep in
contemplation, I could testify for total suspension of subjective interest, even that of a continued
existence of the view. Such contemplation may be attainable in some cases but probably not as
effortlessly, or it might even be unattainable especially if the object of contemplation bears immediate
connection with the contemplator. It could be granted that some subjective interest may exist in aesthetic
judgment. However, that level of interest cannot equal that which is required by morality. Morality, as
beliefs, is at the core of human experience; it is very readily available to the subject so much so that it
creates a very strong subjective interest. People may peacefully disagree on their particular judgments of
the beauty of music, but certain uneasiness and potential conflict arise when it comes to disagreements on
the right to kill animals for food, for example. It is in the consideration of this level of interest that ethics
and aesthetics oppose each other; where one is fully present, the other is not. Therefore, when a viewer of
Von Trier’s Antichrist detects its deeply misogynistic aspects, she is automatically made unable to judge
the film’s aesthetic value; that is, she cannot valuate it as beautiful.11
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The relatedness and mutual exclusion of aesthetics and ethics sum up to a position that rejects
both autonomism and moralism; it partially agrees with moderate moralism, which it views as making a
just but weaker claim. The aim is to present a certain stance of moderate moralism, which not only refutes
the view of the autonomist and the moralist but also some aspects of current arguments for moderate
moralism.
In his article Against Ethical Criticism, Richard A. Posner presents arguments against the inclusion of ethics
in aesthetic judgment. Therein are some points that call for replies; these will be addressed in what
follows.
To justify his rejection of moral judgment of art, Posner presents an objectionable moral definition
of aesthetics: “The aesthetic outlook is a moral outlook, one that stresses the values of openness,
detachment, hedonism, curiosity, tolerance, the cultivation of the self, and the preservation of a private
sphere—in short, the values of liberal individualism.”12 The moral outlook hereby expressed is ill-conceived
because it is of a solely contemplative nature.13 Although it is true that aesthetics are grounded in
contemplation, the morality evoked could not apply to human beings. Morality cannot be merely
contemplative because of its necessary subjective component presented earlier. Were it the case that
human life were enclosed in contemplation, aesthetic evaluation of this sort would be morally permissible
but, alas, it is not the case. The viewers of Von Trier’s films will not be detached from the judgment of their
misogyny for the moral conflict that the films bring about can neither be ignored nor be tolerated. 14
Perhaps in support for this tolerance, Posner says that “great literature must somehow cause the reader to
suspend moral judgment.”15 However, this is the very danger against which ethical valuation comes as an
additional requirement for aesthetic appreciation. For if the most immoral literature can suspend the
reader’s ethical valuation of it, the ethically minded is rightfully alarmed because morality is menaced by
such aesthetic approach which could take over the reader’s “alief” and probably lead to a more or less
disinterested, drawn in approach to real life situations that would or should normally arouse hostility or
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sympathy on moral grounds.16 The concept of “alief,” as introduced by Tamar S. Gendler (2008),
elaborates on subconscious-level behaviors, which, when strongly aroused, can influence conscious belief
and action. If individuals who engage in contemplation eventually immerge from it to engage in action,
and if the outlook taken in the contemplation can affect action; then ethical judgment from within
contemplation should be also determined by one from without.17 Furthermore, what could we possibly
mean by morality if it is mere disinterestedness?18
One could summarize Posner’s position in his statement that “a work of literature is not to be
considered maimed or even marred by expressing unacceptable moral views.” 19 The statement, however,
seems to ignore the consequences of aesthetic appraisal of a work on its consumption and, thereby, on its
influence on the audience’s attitude toward the values that the work expresses. A work of art that is
valued as beautiful is likely to be promoted for greater consumption and this is clearly alarming if the work
is immoral. Though one might be aware of what is immoral or moral in the work, one is inevitably affected
also subconsciously through one’s aliefs. A work of art shapes and is shaped by the society which produces
it. Therefore, aesthetic evaluation should overlook ethics only when the work is not targeted at a human
audience, which is not the case for most humanly produced works, objects of the present discussion.
Insofar as morality is an integral part of citizenship for the wellbeing of society, aesthetic appreciation
cannot be considered as separate from ethics. Viewers of Von Trier’s films may, on moral grounds, be
unable to aesthetically enjoy his work when feminist ideals in mind clash with misogynistic aspects of the
films.
Posner further rejects moral judgments of art because he judges them as misguided and intolerant.
He says that “the moral content of a work of literature is likely to be obsolete whether or not it conforms
to our current moral views.”20 But the “current moral views,” by their very currentness, are not obsolete;
the moral appraisal of a work of literature or any art should be based on its immediate moral value, which
cannot be eliminated on grounds of the obsolescence of the moral content of the work. This only explains
the evolution of morality with regard to time and space, but the valuation of a certain work of art is done
from the audience’s, and not the artist’s, point of view. The argument goes further to accuse moral
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judgment of intolerance: “To devalue a work of literature because of its implicit or explicit politics,
morality, or religion,” Posner says, “is…intolerant, philistine, puritanical, illiberal, and when it expresses
itself in an assumption of moral superiority to our predecessors, complacently ethnocentric.”21 However,
morality is not liberal, at least not when liberalism implies, as it does here, indiscriminate toleration.
Moreover, if morality involves at all any notions of good or bad, right or wrong, then our understanding of
it necessarily evolves/changes over time. Therefore, there is generally nothing ethnocentric about the
assumption of superiority to the predecessors of a generation; it is a historical truth.
Along the same lines, the argument states that “People obsessed by politics, religion or morality
may be incapable of an aesthetic response to literature.”22 One characteristic that these so-called
obsessions share is that they provide the “obsessed” with greater sensitivity to the corresponding values.
This supports the view expressed earlier that works of art with vivid moral aspects resist aesthetic
contemplation. In a world that is more or less political, religious and moral, everyone is, according to this
claim, obsessed. Thus, the impossibility of an aesthetic response, if caused by those factors, would be
quasi-universal. But this is not the case; aesthetic experience is possible.
In his attempt to discard all that calls for ethical criticism in art, Posner paints empathy as amoral
and all effects of art as merely psychological.23 Empathy could be amoral iff associated with things that are
altogether remote from the livelihood of the art’s audience. However, that is not the case as Posner
remarks: “the characters and situations that interest us in literature are for the most part characters and
situations that capture aspects of ourselves and our situation.”24 Feelings aroused by literature are not
always amoral; they require a certain understanding based on the audience’s association with the object
of empathy, an association that could be moral in nature. Thus Noël Carroll (1996) asserts that “many of
the emotions that the audience brings to bear, as a condition of narrative intelligibility, are moral both in
the sense that many emotions […] possess ineliminable moral components, and in the sense that many of
the emotions that are pertinent to narratives are frequently moral emotions.” 25 In support of the
amorality of feelings that literature brings about, Posner contends that the disinterested, ‘art for art’s
sake’ pleasure that much literature affords is particularly remote from morality. 26 It is, indeed, true that
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disinterested pleasure is immediately amoral but this is not the kind of pleasure that one gets from
literature—unlike the pleasure afforded by the sight of the misty morning by the river. The claim that
effects of literature are merely psychological is not sound because even if the immediate effect were
psychological, it would eventually bear moral consequences.27 Here again, one can consider the concept of
“alief,” which is psychological but which can lead to the formation of beliefs and actions that could be
moral in nature. Posner’s claim that “immersion in literature does not make us better citizens or better
people” is false.28

Let us now turn to Noël Carroll’s arguments for moderate moralism. Although the arguments of this paper
mostly align with moderate moralism, there are three points in Carroll’s arguments that we need to
contest.
The first point concerns moral judgment of works of art when their moral aspects are not readily
noticeable. On the subject, Carroll says that “even where given audiences do not detect the moral flaws in
question, the artwork may still be aesthetically flawed, since in those cases the moral flaws sit like timebombs, ready to explode aesthetically once morally sensitive viewers, listeners, and readers actually are
deterred from the response which the work invites.”29 This assertion is correct inasmuch as it presupposes
objective morality. However, if there is such thing as objective morality, it is an eternal absolute and the
understanding of it evolves with regard to time and space, but the human mind is unable to have a
complete grasp of the eternal/timeless. With that in mind, assessment of an artwork is only meaningful if
it takes into account only the understanding of the immediate audience and judge of the artwork. In other
words, it is impossible to assess its potential moral value. Outside of eternity, an artwork is valuable with
regard to time and space, and only in relation to its immediate audience.
The second point is about the relationship between ethical and aesthetic defects. Carroll argues
that an ethical defect “will count as an aesthetic defect when it actually deters the response to which the
work aspires.”30 However, it is often not possible to talk of an artwork’s aspirations. Many artworks do not
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have an intended purpose besides being art,31 especially when the artists produce art for art’s sake. It is
not meaningful to consider aesthetic value of an ethical aspect of a work based on the aspired response.
Assessment of artwork, whether aesthetic or otherwise, is done from the point of view of the audience
and not of the artist. Since the audience is often not able to detect the artist’s intention, if there be one,
ethical judgment is only possible from the audience’s point of view. Furthermore, detected moral defects
automatically discard aesthetic valuation, rather than become aesthetic defects.32
The third point relates to the intention within an artwork and the success of its absorption of the
audience. Carroll advances that morality may contribute to the intention of absorbing the reader, and may
therefore make the artwork more aesthetically valuable.33 I contend that this may be true only when the
moral value is not so strong as to be present in the reader’s mind without further assessment. If the reader
of a narrative artwork is very consciously aware of the moral aspects in play into her absorption, then she
is in no position to assess the aesthetic value of the work. This is because the awareness of the moral
aspects of the work creates a subjective interest that should be non-existent in aesthetic judgment. But
this should not necessarily be a worry because if the reader is truly absorbed, she would not be able to
detect the moral defects or strengths leading the process of absorption in the work. If the interest in
morality is less intense as not to immediately evoke interestedness in the audience, then it can be included
in aesthetic evaluation; but if it is so intense as not to escape moral assessment without further
investigation, then it discards any aesthetic valuation.
In conclusion, I have shown the relationship that I think exists between ethics and aesthetics.
Although the two domains are based on the same criterion, subjective interest; they are mutually
exclusive. They are, however, not autonomous of each other. If we fully consider the nature of ethics and
of aesthetics, we discover that the question of whether they should both participate in valuations of art is
not a most relevant question.34 As Karsten Harries (1968) notes, “to isolate aesthetics from ethics, is to
misunderstand what art is all about.”35 The pertinent question rests on when the two domains can both be
31
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considered and how they influence each other’s participation in appraisals of art. Whether ethics are to be
considered in aesthetic valuation is determined by the level of interestedness that moral aspects of a work
of art bring about. This determination is automatic for it becomes evident upon consumption of a certain
work of art. The present arguments would support the views of those who, after considering the deeply
misogynistic aspects of Von Trier’s films, assess them as aesthetically displeasing; which means that the
works do not qualify for aesthetic judgment because of their inability to allow for an aesthetic experience.
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